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[W]e must sail sometimes with the wind and sometimes against it — but
we must sail, and not drift, not lie at anchor.
– Oliver Wendell Holmes1

This Article shows that the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes’ (ICSID) current rules for arbitration, which
automatically suspend the arbitration proceeds, are direct contributors to
the high costs and long proceedings in ICSID. The Articles also argues that
failing to eliminate the automatic suspension of proceedings is simply
putting off a change that will inevitably need to be made. Following
complaints that investment arbitrations were too costly and too lengthy,
ICSID finally began addressing the issue of arbitrator disqualifications by
initiating a round of amendments in October 2016. ICSID has proposed two
different remedies to this problem, which could replace the original rule: the
first proposal would provide a much-needed increase in ICSID’s efficiency,
but the second proposal is little more than an entrenchment of the status quo.
ICSID should adopt a slightly modified version of the first proposal to
continue the proceedings in the face of arbitrator challenges.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Though the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), which has administered the majority of all international investment
cases and has styled itself as the “the world’s leading institution devoted to
international investment dispute settlement,”2 has amended its Convention
Arbitration Rules four times, its rules on arbitrator disqualifications have
merely drifted, batted about by various cross winds, until quite recently.3
Following complaints that investment arbitrations were too costly and too
lengthy, ICSID finally began addressing the issue of arbitrator
disqualifications by initiating a round of amendments in October 2016. After
taking suggestions from Member States and the public on rule-amendment
topics, the ICSID Secretariat produced an initial working paper (WP # 1) on
August 2, 2018.4 Following a second round of written comments from
Member States and the public, consultation meetings with Member States,
and presentations, ICSID issued an updated working paper (WP # 2) on
2. About ICSID, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES [ICSID]:
WORLD BANK GROUP, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/ default.aspx (last visited May 3,
2019).
3. ICSID, Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules 154 (ICSID Working Paper # 2, 2019)
[hereinafter WP # 2].
4. Id.
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March 15, 2019.5 ICSID intends for Member States to vote on the
amendments in October 2019.6
The most recent round of amendments marks the fifth time ICSID has
altered its Regulations and Rules in its fifty-year history, the last time being
in 2006.7 In the thirteen years since the last round of amendments, thirteen
new Member States have joined the ICSID Convention (“the Convention”),
while Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela each left the Convention.8 The
caseload has also increased: fifty-three cases were filed in 2018, more than
double the number filed in 2006.9 Yet this growth has not come without
challenges. ICSID Secretary-General Meg Kinnear views the amendments
not only as part of a periodic reconsideration of the rules, but as a direct
response to the criticisms that investor-state dispute settlement is not
sufficiently efficient and cost-effective and that it does not adequately
respect state sovereignty.10
In this Article, I will show that the current rules for arbitrator
disqualifications, which automatically suspend the arbitration proceedings,
are direct contributors to the high costs and long proceedings in ICSID and
will argue that failing to eliminate the automatic suspension of proceedings
is simply putting off a change that will inevitably need to be made. The
average delay created by an arbitrator challenge is eighty-one days.11 With
individual cases seeing anywhere from one to nine arbitrator challenges, this
delay can quickly become unwieldy.12 ICSID has proposed two different
remedies to this problem that could replace the original rule: the WP # 1
proposal would provide a much-needed increase in ICSID’s efficiency, but
the WP # 2 proposal is little more than an entrenchment of the status quo.
ICSID should adopt the WP # 1 proposal to continue the proceedings in the
face of arbitrator challenges.
In Section II, I include the current rule in the Convention, outline
criticisms of the procedure currently in place, and present ICSID’s proposals
to update the rules on arbitrator challenges. I also detail four ways in which
ICSID takes a different approach than the rules of other arbitral systems: the
rules differ in whether arbitrator challenges are dealt with through an
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Alexander G. Leventhal, The 2018 Proposals for Amendments of the ICSID Rules: ICSID
Enters the Era of Trump, Populism, and State Sovereignty, 22 AM. SOC’Y INT’L LAW INSIGHTS 15 (2018).
8. Id.
9. ICSID, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics, THE ICSID CASELOAD – STATISTICS, no. 1, 2019, at
1, 7.
10. Leventhal, supra note 7.
11. See infra Appendix 1.
12. Id.
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automatic suspension of the proceedings under the rules, when challenges
may be brought, who considers the challenges, and what standard is applied
to the challenges.
Section III includes an assessment of whether arbitrator challenges
create a problem in the form of increased cost and time by comparing the
number of successful arbitrator challenges to unsuccessful challenges.
Though some sources have compiled lists of all arbitrator challenges in
ICSID cases, these compilations have become outdated.13 The argument in
this Article adds to the scholarship by laying out the length of the delay each
of these challenges has caused, a statistic no other article has analyzed. The
data gathered show the percentage of cases with challenges, the total amount
of delay through challenges, and the success rate through challenges.
In Section IV, I apply the data to the problems identified in Section III.
There I argue that, because only five of the 146 arbitrator challenges that
have been made public have been upheld, there is a need for change from the
status quo.14 It also explains that Rule 29 is the appropriate change for four
reasons: 1) Rule 29 would decrease the overall number of challenges and the
number of arbitrators that resign after a party files an arbitrator challenge
against them, 2) Rule 29 would make challenges that are still made less
disruptive to the arbitral proceedings than under the current rule, 3) WP # 2’s
term limits do not eliminate the need for Rule 29’s continuation of the
proceedings, and 4) adopting Rule 29 would not call into question the
legitimacy of the tribunal’s decisions. I conclude in Section V that WP # 1
is the right approach for ICSID to take.
II. ICSID REFORM PROPOSAL
The original rule for arbitrator disqualification stands in stark contrast
to the proposed changes in their initial form, though the proposal eventually
drifted back to the status quo. At present, the original rule provides a
procedurally murky avenue for parties to delay proceedings: even though the
actual disqualification process is unclear, it is accompanied by an automatic
suspension of the arbitration until the conflict is resolved. The first set of
proposed changes provided both procedural clarity and eliminated automatic
suspension. These proposals drew the ire of select vocal opponents, who
lobbied for a more tempered shift away from the status quo. The latest round
13. See generally Meg Kinnear & Frauke Nitschke, Disqualification of Arbitrators under the ICSID
Convention and Rules, in CHALLENGES AND RECUSALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2014); see also KAREL DAELE,
CHALLENGE AND DISQUALIFICATION OF ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 455–61
(2012).
14. See infra Appendix 1.
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of proposals, while offering some additional procedural clarity, continue
automatic suspensions, as with the original rule. Each of these steps are
addressed in turn below.
A. Original Rule
Article 57 of the Convention empowers a party to propose the
disqualification of a member of the arbitral tribunal “on account of any fact
indicating a manifest lack of qualities required by paragraph (1) of Article
14.”15 Although it never provides an explanation of these qualities, Article
14(1) of the Convention requires that arbitrators on ICSID tribunals be
individuals who possess “high moral character” and “recognized
competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry, or finance” and be
capable of exercising “independent judgment.”16 Yet these characteristics
receive no further definition or delineation.17 The Convention outlines no
other requirements for members of the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators. The three
main grounds for challenge ICSID has seen in cases with proposals for
arbitrator disqualifications are nationality, lack of capacity, and lack of
independence.18 Historically, lack of independence has been the most widely
used of the three.19 Most disqualification proposals allege partiality of the
challenged arbitrator based on various factual circumstances, which would
purportedly affect his or her ability to exercise independent judgment.20
If a party does decide to pursue disqualification, Article 58 of the
Convention lays out the relevant procedure.21 Pursuant to this article, a party
first files a proposal for disqualification with the Secretary-General, then the
Secretary-General transmits the proposal to the tribunal and the Chairman
15. ICSID, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, art. 57, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/
resources/2006%20CRR_English-final.pdf [hereinafter Convention].
16. Id. art. 14(1).
17. Id.
18. Meg Kinnear, Challenge of Arbitrators at ICSID—An Overview, 108 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L.
412, 414–15 (2014). The disqualification based on nationality is applicable when a sole arbitrator or the
majority of arbitrators has the same nationality as either of the parties without an agreement by both
parties. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 415.
21. The Article reads:
The decision on any proposal to disqualify a conciliator or arbitrator shall be taken by the other
members of the Commission or Tribunal as the case may be, provided that where those
members are equally divided, or in the case of a proposal to disqualify a sole conciliator or
arbitrator, or a majority of the conciliators or arbitrators, the Chairman shall take that decision.
If it is decided that the proposal is well-founded the conciliator or arbitrator to whom the
decision relates shall be replaced in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Chapter III
or Section 2 of Chapter IV.
Convention, supra note 15, art. 58.
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and notifies the other party of the proposal.22 In response, the accused
arbitrator may submit explanations to the tribunal or Chairman.23 The other
members of the tribunal make the first effort at deciding on the proposal, but
the role of decision-maker passes to the Chairman if the remaining tribunal
members are equally divided.24 If proposals for disqualification are filed
against a majority of the arbitrators, the ability to decide on the matter passes
directly to the Chairman.25
ICSID does not provide a clear timeline outlining when parties to the
arbitration may file a proposal for an arbitral disqualification. Rule 9 requires
that proposals for disqualification be brought “promptly,” as measured
relative to the date on which the filing party becomes aware of the
circumstances on which the claim is based, and before the proceedings are
closed.26 While the timeliness of the proposal is determined on a case-bycase basis, ICSID tribunals have decided that filing a challenge within ten
days of discovering the underlying facts fulfilled the promptness
requirement, whereas filing after fifty-three days did not.27
The Convention is similarly vague when providing for arbitrator
challenges. The Convention gives no express time constraint to the
remaining members of the tribunal for deciding arbitrator challenges,
although it does state that they “shall promptly consider and vote on the
proposal [for arbitrator disqualification].28 A recommended timeframe of
thirty days is provided in the case that the proposal is sent to the Chairman,
but the rule provides only that the Chairman will use his or her “best efforts”
to make a decision on the proposal.
Even with the recommended timeframe, Chairman-led determinations
still predominately fail to adhere to the timeline. Additionally, there are no
safeguards in place to move proceedings forward when the Chairman does

22. Id.
23. ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), rule 9(3) (2006)
[hereinafter Arbitration Rules].
24. Convention, supra note 15, at art. 58.
25. Id.
26. Arbitration Rules, supra note 23, at rule 9(6); see also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de
Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the Arbitral
Tribunal, ¶ 23 (Oct. 22, 2007) (“Prof. Christoph Schreuer specifically addresses the question of the
meaning of ‘promptly’ with respect to challenges to disqualify an arbitrator . . . ‘Promptly means that the
proposal to disqualify must be made as soon as the party concerned learns of the grounds for a possible
disqualification.’”).
27. Burlington Res., Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/05, Decision on the
Proposal for Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ¶ 73 (Dec. 13, 2013).
28. Arbitration Rules, supra note 23, at rule 9(4).
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exceed the thirty-day period.29 Of the 110 arbitrator challenges that have
reached a decision, fifty-seven of them were decided by the Chairman and
forty-six of them were decided by the remaining co-arbitrators. The identity
of the decision-maker was not made public in the remaining seven cases. The
Chairman decided on the proposal within the thirty-day recommendation
period only seven times, or in twelve percent of proposals that came before
him or her. The Chairman has made decisions in as few as eleven days, but
he or she has also needed as long as 231 days to consider a proposal, which
is almost eight times the recommended timeframe.
Notably, arbitral proceedings are suspended until either the
unchallenged arbitrators or the Chairman decide on the proposal for
disqualification.30 This procedure has the effect of lengthening the
adjudication process.31
B. Need for Change
The aforementioned rules governing disqualification have been
untouched since 1968, with only minor exceptions, but it appears that many
Member States are unhappy with the rules as they are.32 After ICSID opened
the discussion for potential member topics, multiple Member States and
members of the public mentioned the need to reconsider the rules on the
disqualification of arbitrators.33
Specifically, in comments during the proposal process, multiple
Member States were concerned with parties, and particularly states,
launching arbitrator challenges as a “strategic tool” to buy additional time
during the proceedings.34 Parties are increasingly using arbitrator challenges
not as a method of ensuring the integrity and fairness of the proceedings, but
rather as a technique of “procedural gamesmanship” to delay the proceedings
or frustrate the opposing party.35 Frivolous arbitrator challenges have even
been categorized as “guerilla tactics”—techniques used by a party incapable

29. Nora Ciancio, The Implications of Recent ICSID Arbitrator Disqualifications for Latin
America, 6 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 440, 453 (2014).
30. Arbitration Rules, supra note 23, at Rule 9(6).
31. See infra Appendix 1.
32. ICSID, 3 Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules 154 (ICSID Working Paper # 1, 2018)
[hereinafter WP # 1].
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., ICSID, RULE AMENDMENT PROJECT – MEMBER STATE & PUBLIC COMMENTS ON
WORKING PAPER # 1 OF AUGUST 3, 2018, at 224, 229 (2018), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/
Compendium_Comments_Rule_Amendment_3.15.19.pdf (listing Canada and Spain as Member States
concerned with parties using arbitrator challenges as strategic tools to buy additional time).
35. William T. O’Brien & Sandeep N. Nandivada, Arbitrator Challenges: Warranted or Abuse?,
29 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. no. 10, 2014, at 29.
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of presenting a strong case intended to avoid or delay confrontation by
wearing down the other party or the members of the arbitral tribunal.36 One
such example is the case of ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela, in which
Venezuela brought six challenges against a single arbitrator over the period
of four years.37 All of the challenges were dismissed, but many onlookers
questioned whether Venezuela was misusing arbitrator challenges.38
ICSID has provided two different alternatives for upgrading the process
for arbitrator disqualification: Rule 29 and Article 21.39 Article 21 is an
updated version of Rule 29, but changes in other articles in the proposal
created changes in the rule number.
C. Proposed New Rule: WP # 1 Rule 29
In its various working papers, ICSID has provided several drafts of rules
modifying the arbitrator disqualification process. The original proposal in
WP # 1 Rule 29 eliminates the current Convention’s policy of an automatic
suspension in the case of a request that an arbitrator be disqualified.40 It
instead specifies that the proceedings will continue, unless the parties agree
to suspend the proceedings.41 If the member in question is disqualified, either
party may request that the reconstituted tribunal reconsider any order or
decision issued by the tribunal while the proposal is pending.42
Rule 29 also lays out time restrictions missing in the current provision.
Under this new rule, a proposal for disqualification would have to be filed
after the constitution of the tribunal and within twenty days after the later of
either the tribunal’s constitution or the date on which the party challenging
the arbitrator “first knew or first should have known of the facts on which
the proposal is based.”43

36. Preet Singh Oberoi, Understanding Guerilla Tactics in International Arbitration, 3 CHRIST U.
L. J. 69, 73–74 (2014).
37. Lucia Raimanova, Arbitrator Conflicts in a Global Era: Some Reflections on the Challenges in
ConocoPhillips v Venezuela, as the Quantum Phase of the Case Nears Its Conclusion, PRAC. L. ARB.
BLOG (Oct. 10, 2016), http://arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com/arbitrator-conflicts-in-a-global-era-somereflections-on-the-challenges-in-conocophillips-v-venezuela-as-the-quantum-phase-of-the-case-nearsits-conclusion.
38. Id.
39. WP # 1, supra note 32, art. 29. Rule 29 is ICSID’s original proposal, presented in WP # 1.
Article 21 is a revised version of the proposal, which is presented in WP # 2.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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D. Proposed New Rule: WP # 2 Article 21
The authors of the draft rules reversed course in Article 21 of WP # 2,
replacing the language previously proposed in Rule 29. Article 21
reinstituted the automatic suspension in the draft rule: “The proceedings
shall be suspended until a decision on the proposal has been made, except to
the extent that the parties agree to continue the proceeding in whole or in
part.”44 This alteration was made in light of comments submitted by Member
States and the public both in favor of and against the proposal and reverses
the default rule in WP # 1. 45 Under WP # 1, the proceedings are continued
unless the parties agree otherwise. In WP # 2, the proceedings are suspended
unless the parties agree otherwise. As can readily be seen, the latter proposal
would not prevent the use of an arbitrator challenge as a guerilla tactic, since
the challenging party is unlikely to agree to carry on with the proceedings if
the purpose of the challenge is to delay them.
Comments in favor of the proposal tend to focus on the potential
increase in efficiency, while comments against the proposal generally
question the legitimacy of decisions made by a tribunal in which an arbitrator
is later disqualified.46 In order to resolve concerns about legitimacy, some
comments suggest that the tribunal eliminate the automatic suspension but
give either party the ability to request that the reconstituted tribunal
reconsider any actions made by the challenged arbitrator if that arbitrator is
disqualified.47 As elaborated upon in Section IV, some question the
efficiency of such an alteration, since reconsidering actions made by the
disqualified arbitrator would increase the time and cost of the proceeding.48
The WP # 2 proposal seems to represent a middle ground for ICSID,
since the proposal maintains the current state of affairs by upholding the
automatic suspension of proceedings while granting the parties ability to
agree not to suspend the arbitration, either in part or in whole. Though similar
to the current rule in that the preferred response is a suspension of the arbitral
proceedings, the WP # 2 proposal varies from the current rule by granting
the parties the autonomy to derogate from this automatic suspension and
agree to continue with the proceedings. ICSID believes that this proposal
would “allow the parties to agree to continue with all or part of the case
schedule,” but also “ensure that a challenge has minimal impact on the

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
Rica).

WP # 2, supra note 3, art. 21.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id.
ICSID, RULE AMENDMENT PROJECT, supra note 34, at 224–25 (comment received from Costa
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overall time to complete the arbitration.”49
WP # 2 Article 21, like the version proposed in WP # 1, lays out time
restrictions that are missing in the current provision. However, this second
proposal slightly lengthens the period a party has to file an arbitrator
disqualification.50
Table 1. Comparison of ICSID Rules on Proposals for Arbitrator
Disqualification
Current Rule: WP # 1 Rule 29 WP # 2 Article
ICSID
21
Convention
Rule 9
Effect of proposal Suspension
Proceedings
Suspension,
for
until a decision will continue,
unless the
disqualification
has been
unless the
parties agree to
on proceedings
made*
parties agree to continue***
a suspension**
Twenty-one
Time frame for
Promptly and
Twenty days
filing an
before the
from the later of days from the
later of the
arbitrator
proceedings
the tribunal’s
tribunal’s
disqualification
are declared
constitution or
constitution or
closed*
the date on
the date on
which the
proposing party which the
proposing
k’[new or
party knew or
should have
should have
known about
known about
the underlying
the underlying
facts**
facts***
* Arbitration Rules, supra note 23, art. 9(6).
** WP # 1, supra note 32, art. 29.
*** WP # 2, supra note 3, art. 21.
E. What Makes ICSID’s Arbitrator Challenge Process Different?
The ICSID standard and process for dealing with arbitrator challenges
vary in significant ways from the standard and process usually applied in
international commercial arbitration. The processes differ in four main ways:
49. WP # 2, supra note 3, at 142.
50. Id.
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whether arbitrator challenges are dealt with an automatic suspension of the
proceedings, when challenges may be brought, who considers the
challenges, and what standard is applied to the challenges. Despite
differences between the two systems, the international commercial
arbitration system is still instructive because it also allows for ad hoc party
appointments.51 This means that parties in both systems select the
adjudicators of their disputes, generally without reference to a list of preapproved arbitrators, a characteristic that is often touted in both systems
because it supposedly guarantees that the parties are able to handpick
adjudicators who have the legal knowledge and practical expertise most
appropriate for the circumstances of each case.52 Furthermore, these
similarities are not surprising, given that both arbitration systems are based
on the same structural design.53
Despite their similarities, the differences are perhaps more significant.
The first major difference is that the vast majority other major arbitration
rules do not provide for the automatic suspension of proceedings following
an arbitrator challenge, but rather provide only for the possibility of
suspension.54 The American Arbitration Association-International Centre for
Dispute Resolution (ICDR-AAA), the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), and the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) rules do not mention suspension
at all.55 On the other hand, the China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) Rules specify that those challenged shall
continue to serve on the tribunal until the CIETAC Chairman has made a
final decision on the proposal for disqualification. The Hong Kong
International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) Rules state that the proceeding
may continue pending decision on the challenge.56

51. MARIA NICOLE CLEIS, THE INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY OF ICSID ARBITRATORS 108
(2017).
52. Id. at 108–09.
53. See ERIC DE BRABANDERE, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS 2 (2014) (considering ICSID arbitration to be a form of
commercial arbitration); Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species
of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 139 (2006) (explaining that commercial arbitration
rules served as a model for the structural design of ICSID arbitration). But see Gabrielle KaufmannKohler, Foreword to ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID (2012) (“ICSID arbitration procedure
was not based on commercial arbitration.”).
54. Yarik Kryvoi, ICSID Arbitration Reform: Mapping Concerns of Users and How to Address
Them, BRITISH INST. OF INT’L AND COMP. L. 4 (Nov. 30, 2018).
55. ARIF H. ALI, JANE WESSEL, ALEXANDRE DE GRAMONT & RYAN MELLSKE, THE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULEBOOK: A GUIDE TO ARBITRAL REGIMES 325–31 (2019) (on file with
author).
56. Id. at 51.
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The rules also differ in when arbitrator challenges may be brought. The
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Arbitration Rules of 2013 allow challenges to be brought whenever there are
“justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.”57
These challenges are assessed by the Appointing Authority, who is an
individual either designated by parties in their agreement or the SecretaryGeneral of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.58 Past decisions on
disqualifications have determined that the essential inquiry was into whether
the specific circumstances could create a reasonable perception of a lack of
impartiality or independence, not whether the Appointing Authority actually
believed that the arbitrator is impartial or biased. Similarly, the SCC Rules
allow for challenges in the same situation of justifiable doubts or when an
arbitrator fails to meet any requirements the parties have agreed upon.59
Furthermore, the Rules explicitly state that “every arbitrator must be
impartial and independent.”60 Likewise, the LCIA Rules require that
arbitrators be impartial and independent, and allow parties bring a challenge
against an arbitrator “if circumstances exist which give rise to justifiable
doubts as to his impartiality or independence.”61 Meanwhile, the words
“impartial” and independent” never appear in the ICSID Convention. Just
like the UNCITRAL Rules, the SCC and LCIA Rules use an objective thirdperson standard and do not require proof of the arbitrator’s actual
independence or bias.62
Unlike disqualification requests in other systems, those for ICSID are
decided, or at least first considered, by the unchallenged members of the
tribunal, which has had the subsequent effect of elevating the threshold that
successful challenges must meet.63 This is a highly atypical approach in
international arbitration, since most other international arbitration rules
specify that the challenge decision will be made by either the arbitral
institution or the appointing authority, which instead imitates the approach
taken in the Statute of the International Court of Justice.64 The KompetenzKompetenz principle authorizes the tribunal to consider issues of its own
57. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 12, para. 1. (Dec. 16, 2013).
58. Id. at art. 13, para. 4; art. 6, para. 1.
59. ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION RULES
art. 19 (2017).
60. Id. at art. 18(1).
61. THE LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION RULES art. 10.1 (2014)
(stating that “[a]n arbitrator may . . . be challenged by any party if circumstances exist that give rise to
justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence”).
62. CLEIS, supra note 51, at 143, n.781.
63. Id. at 85.
64. DAELE, supra note 13, 170.
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competence, and this principle serves as the foundation of the practice of
having the co-arbitrators decide arbitrator challenges.65 Even though a party
to an ICSID dispute first filed an arbitrator challenge in 1982, the
unchallenged arbitrators of the ICSID tribunal did not uphold a challenge
against one of their peers until 2013.66 Having the remaining arbitrators
decide against one of their peers is a difficult and uneasy position for those
arbitrators, regardless of the case’s specific merits.67 The position is made
even more difficult by the fact that most arbitrators know each other and
have longstanding professional relationships with each other.68 Furthermore,
since arbitrators are generally selected from a small group of qualified
individuals, it is highly likely that many of the arbitrators who are asked to
adjudicate a challenge have faced a challenge themselves.69 As of 2012,
forty-three arbitrators had voted on challenges, and fourteen of them, or
32.5% of them, had faced one themselves.70 This system of judgment by
peers thereby raises the possibility that considerations extraneous to the
case’s merits could affect the decision. It also increases the likelihood that
arbitrators may raise the threshold required for upholding an arbitrator
challenge because they do not want to disqualify a peer or because they fear
being held to a higher standard if they are ever put in the same situation.71
In Amco Asia v. Indonesia, the tribunal held that “[t]he challenging
party must prove not only facts indicating the lack of independence, but also
that the lack is ‘manifest’ or ‘highly probable,’ not just ‘possible’ or ‘quasicertain.’” In its decision, the tribunal cited a comment by scholar Christoph
Scheuer about the “relatively heavy burden of proof” the term “manifest”
places on the party attempting to disqualify an arbitrator.72 An ICSID
tribunal specifically rejected the “reasonable doubt” test in OPIC Karimum
v. Venezuela, holding that “it is not sufficient show an appearance of a lack

65. Id.
66. Lukas Pfister, Who Decides Arbitrator Challenges? — A Comparative Analysis of Institutional
Approaches, 15 SCHIEDSVZ, no. 4, 2017, at 164, 168.
67. Chiara Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration?, 35 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 431, 477 (2013).
68. Id.
69. Id.; Daniel Robert Kalderimis, The Future of the ICSID Convention: Bigger, Better, Faster?,
in ICSID CONVENTION AFTER 50 YEARS: UNSETTLED ISSUES 553, 571 (Christina Baltag ed., 2016).
70. DAELE, supra note 13, at 173.
71. Christine Meerah Kim, Issue Conflict in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Focusing on the
Challenges against Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña in CC/Devas et al. v. India and Repsol v.
Argentina, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 621, 640 (2014).
72. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of
the Arbitral Tribunal, ¶¶ 34, 41 (Oct. 22, 2007).
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of impartiality or independence.”73 This “manifest” standard is an objective
standard, which must be based on reasonable evaluation by a third party.74
Finally, different arbitral systems apply different standards to proposals
for arbitrator disqualification. Although this is a discussion that is largely
outside the scope of this paper, given that any change in the standard for
disqualification was purposefully excluded from consideration in this
amendment process, this notoriously high standard is a contributing factor to
the low number of sustained challenges under ICISD Rules.75 The ICSID
challenge process seems to take a more narrow and conservative approach
than many other systems involved in investment-treaty dispute settlement,
and there remains a perception that an arbitrator challenge is successful only
if the disqualification proposal reveals something “rather shocking.”76 The
ICSID standard for arbitrator disqualification has even been referred to as
“notoriously” or “impossibly” high.77
Such disqualifying conduct is in line with the original, Article 57,
standard empowering a party to propose the disqualification of a member of
the arbitral tribunal “on account of any fact indicating a manifest lack of
qualities required by paragraph (1) of Article 14.”78 The original draft of the
ICSID Convention produced by the General Counsel of the World Bank in
June 1962 prescribed a much lower standard, expressed in Section 6(1) of
Article VII of the document. This draft stated that a party could enter a
proposal for an arbitrator disqualification “on the ground that he has an
interest in the subject matter of the dispute or that he had, prior to his
appointment, dealt with the dispute in any capacity whatever.”79 After many
rounds of drafts and meetings, the staff of the World Bank issued a working
paper in the fall of 1964 that became known as the “First Draft” of the
Convention. The phrase “manifest lack of the qualities required by Article
14(1),” currently used in Article 57, first appeared in Article 60 of this
draft.80

73. OPIC Karimum Corp. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/14,
Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify Professor Philippe Sands, Arbitrator, ¶ 45 (May 5, 2011).
74. Charles B. Rosenberg, Challenging Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 27 J. INT’L
ARB. 505, 508 (2010).
75. Am. Soc’y of Int’l L., Unfolding the Working Paper on ICSID Rules Amendment: Interview
with Meg Kinnear, YOUTUBE (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.asil.org/resources/video/asil-events/.
76. Kalderimis, supra note 69, at 571.
77. Id. at 570.
78. Convention, supra note 15, art. 57.
79. ICSID, 1 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND
THE FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN
STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 262 (1970).
80. Id.
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The meaning of this phrase was never explicitly discussed during the
drafting process, but the five challenges that have been upheld shed light on
the standard. The first challenge upheld was filed in 2005 in the case Pey
Casado v. Chile.81 Although not instructive otherwise, the case did
demonstrate that successful challenges were possible under this standard. On
August 24, 2005, the Respondent filed a request for the disqualification of
the entire tribunal.82 In response, one of the arbitrators, Galo Leoro Franco,
resigned two days later.83 The respondent based its complaint on the fact that
the tribunal had not made an arbitral award and did not seem to be close to
making an award, even though the case had been filed six years earlier.84
Following a request from the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative
Council, Tjaco van den Hout, the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, recommended that the Chairman reject the proposal to
disqualify Professor Pierre Lalive, but accept the proposal to disqualify
Minister Mohammed Bedjaoui.85 The Chairman followed this advice exactly
but did not provide any reasoning behind the decision.86
The next arbitrator challenge to be upheld called into question the
standard that had been applied in previous arbitrator challenges. The
arbitrator challenge in Blue Bank v. Venezuela was filed in August 2013.87
The respondent challenged arbitrator José María Alonso, who, at the time,
was a managing partner of the litigation-and-arbitration department in the
Madrid office of Baker & McKenzie, a member of the Steering Committee
of the global-arbitration practice group, and a member of the Steering

81. See id. (containing no explanation of the meaning of “manifest lack of qualities”).
82. See generally Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID
Case No. ARB/98/2, Respondent’s Request for the Disqualification of the Three Members of the Tribunal
(Aug. 23, 2005).
83. See generally Letter from Galo Leoro Franco, Arbitrator, to Monsieur Roberto Danino,
Secretary General, ICSID (Aug. 26, 2005) (on file with ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2).
84. See Victor Pey Casado, Respondent’s Request for the Disqualification of the Three Members
of the Tribunal (stating that the arbitral claim was filed more than seven years ago, marking the longest
time an ICSID case has been pending without an arbitral award or a judicial decision, although there is
no reason to believe that a conclusion is imminent).
85. Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No.
ARB/98/2, Recommendation of the PCA Secretary-General as to the Proposal for the Disqualification of
Prof. Lalive and Judge Bedjaoi (Feb. 17, 2006).
86. Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No.
ARB/98/2, Decision of the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council on the Disqualification of
Prof. Lalive and Judge Bedjaoui (Feb. 21, 2006).
87. ICSID, Case Details: Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. V. Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB 12/20), ICSID: WORLD BANK GROUP, https://icsid.worldbank.org/
en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/12/20 (click “Procedural Details,” then see “(a) Original
Proceeding” and “(b) Annulment Proceeding” on webpage to see two proceedings) (last visited October
20, 2019).
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Committee of the Baker & McKenzie International European Dispute
Practice Group.88 Longreef Investments A.V.V. (Longreef) was a client of
Baker & McKenzie at the time of the arbitration proceeding and was
involved in a case against Venezuela.89 The respondent questioned Alonso’s
independence and impartiality based on the fact that Baker & McKenzie,
which has a global legal practice, represented Longreef in a different office,
alleging that different offices cannot be considered separate for the purposes
of an arbitrator challenge.90 It specifically argued that since Alonso was a
member of global committees within the firm, part of his remuneration
depended on the firm’s global profit, even if the remuneration from Longreef
was minimal.91
Alonso countered that the Baker & McKenzie offices were separate
legal entities and that his remuneration as a partner would have changed
either insignificantly or not at all based on the profit Baker & McKenzie New
York and Caracas received from the Longreef v. Venezuela case.92 In
assessing this challenge, the Chairman applied what was a lower threshold
than in the majority of previous ICSID cases.93 The Chairman, Dr. Jim Yong
Kim, stated that “Articles 57 and 14(1) of the ICSID Convention do not
require proof of actual dependence or bias; rather it is sufficient to establish
the appearance of dependence or bias.”94 Additionally, he defined the
applicable standard as objective and “based on a reasonable evaluation of the
evidence by a third party.”95 In applying the standard, the Chairman found
that “a third party would find an evident or obvious appearance of lack of
impartiality” in Alonso’s case.96
The application of the “reasonable-third-party standard” continued in
an arbitrator challenge filed that same year in Burlington Res. v. Republic of
Ecuador. In this case, Ecuador filed the proposal for arbitrator
disqualification against arbitrator Francisco Orrego Vicuña.97 Although
88. Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID
Case No. ARB/12/20, Decision on the Parties’ Proposals to Disqualify a Majority of the Tribunal, ¶ 23
(Nov. 12, 2013).
89. Id. at ¶ 22.
90. Id. at ¶¶ 25–26.
91. Id.
92. Id. at ¶¶ 39–40.
93. Marc Lalonde, Chapter 46: Quo Vadis Disqualification? in BUILDING INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW: THE FIRST 50 YEARS OF ICSID 641, 646 (Meg Kinnear et al. eds., 2015).
94. Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID
Case No. ARB/12/20, Decision on the Parties’ Proposals to Disqualify a Majority of the Tribunal, ¶ 59
(Nov. 12, 2013).
95. Id. at ¶60.
96. Id. at ¶ 69.
97. See generally Burlington Res., Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5,
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Ecuador had asked Orrego Vicuña to disclose all cases that he had accepted
as arbitrator in which Freshfields was counsel, he did not disclose any such
appointments since 2008, though he had been appointed in eight cases
between 2007 and 2013.98 After discovering that Orrego Vicuña had, in fact,
since been repeatedly appointed by Freshfields, Ecuador brought a proposal
for disqualification arguing that the arbitrator had been appointed by
Freshfields in an “unacceptably high number of cases,” that he had breached
his obligation to disclose circumstances that could call his independence into
question, and that he had exhibited “a blatant lack of impartiality to the
detriment of Ecuador.”99 Freshfields had appointed Orrego Vicuña as an
arbitrator in eight ICSID cases between 2007 and 2013, but Orrego Vicuña
did not disclose his appointments in any of these cases.100 After applying the
applicable legal standard of an “objective standard based on a reasonable
evaluation of the evidence by a third party,” the Chairman found that a
reasonable third party would find that Orrego Vicuña exhibited an
appearance of a lack of impartiality.101
The next case, Caratube v. Kazakhstan, marked the first time the two
unchallenged arbitrators disqualified the third.102 In this case, the claimants
challenged Bruno Boesch’s appointment, arguing that he “manifestly [could
not] be independent and impartial” because he was serving as an arbitrator
appointed by Kazakhstan in another related case, which relied on essentially
the same factual allegations.103 After applying the same reasonable-thirdparty standard used in Blue Bank, the remaining members of the tribunal
found that they could not reasonably ask Boesch to “maintain a ‘Chinese
wall’ in his own mind,” meaning that his understanding of the arbitration
may be influenced by information he learned in the other arbitration.104
The final case in which an arbitrator challenge has been upheld is Big
Sky Energy Corp. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, but information about this
challenge has not been made public. ICSID publishes all awards issued by
an Arbitral tribunal with consent of the parties.105 Although the parties to this
Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña (Dec. 13, 2013).
98. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 25.
99. Id. at ¶ 20.
100. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 25.
101. Id. at ¶¶ 67, 80.
102. Chiara Giorgetti, Caratube v. Kazakhstan: For the First Time Two ICSID Arbitrators Uphold
Disqualification of Third Arbitrator, 18 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS 1 (Sept. 29, 2014).
103. Caratube International Oil Co. LLP & Mr. Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan,
ICSID Case No. ARB 13/13, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Mr. Bruno Boesch, ¶¶ 24–
26 (Mar. 20, 2014).
104. Id. at ¶ 27.
105. ICSID, Confidentiality and Transparency – ICSID Convention Arbitration, ICSID: WORLD
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arbitration case did not agree to make the decision public, ICSID has still
published a register of all proceedings.106 This case was filed in July 2017
and is still pending.107
III. DO THE RULES CREATE AN UNDUE TIME-AND-COST
BURDEN?
A. Does the Suspension of Proceedings Increase the Length and Cost of the
Proceeding?
The proposals regarding the process of arbitrator challenges aim at
addressing the concern that ICSID arbitration is not sufficiently time nor cost
effective.108 This mirrors similar concerns in the field. A survey compiled by
the International Bar Association Arbitration Subcommittee on Investment
Treaty Arbitration revealed that ninety-five percent of survey respondents
were concerned about the duration of arbitration proceedings and the
availability of arbitrator. Furthermore, a clear majority of respondents saw
at least some concern with fees associated with attorneys, experts, and
arbitrators.109
Whether this is an issue warranting an amendment to the ICSID rules
on arbitrator disqualifications merits asking a further question: whether such
proposals for arbitrator disqualification as WP # 1 and WP # 2 ad so much
of a burden to the proceedings in terms of cost and time as to justify
eliminating the automatic suspension now in effect under Rule 9.110
To determine the impact of arbitrator challenges, I compiled statistical
tables, which are available in Appendices 1 and 2 of this Article. In doing
so, I was able to determine the percentage of cases with challenges, the total
amount of delay through challenge, and the success rate through challenges.
ICSID provides procedural details on all cases that have been made public.
After examining these cases, I made a list of every case in which an arbitrator
had been challenged, the date the challenge was filed, and the date the
challenge was resolved, either because the tribunal decided on the challenge,
BANK GROUP, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Confidentiality-and-Transparency.aspx (last
visited Oct. 27, 2019).
106. Id.
107. ICSID, Case Details: Big Sky Energy Corp. v. Republic of Kazakhstan (ICSID Case No.
ARB/17/22)
(ICSID
Case
No.
ARB
17/22),
ICSID
WORLD
BANK
GROUP,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/ cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/17/22 (last visited Oct. 27,
2019).
108. Am. Soc’y of Int’l L., supra note 75.
109. IBA ARBITRATION SUBCOMM. ON INV. TREATY ARIBTRATION, INT’L BAR ASS’N,
CONSISTENCY, EFFICIENCY AND TRANSPARENCY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 1, 36 (2018).
110. WP # 1, supra note 32.
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the challenging party withdrew the proposal for disqualification, the
proceeding was discontinued, or the challenged arbitrator resigned. In doing
so, I counted a challenge to multiple members of the tribunal or the entire
tribunal in order to identify the total number of challenges separately. I
calculated the time between these dates to determine the total amount of time
the arbitrator challenge delayed the proceedings. These statistics are
compiled in Appendix 1 of this Article.
In the calculus resulting in Appendix 1, I had counted a challenge to
multiple members of the tribunal or the entire tribunal in order to identify the
total number of challenges separately. But because the total time delay did
not increase and therefore did not add any additional time burden if the
challenges overlapped, I compiled a list in Appendix 2 simply calculating
the total amount of delay, without regard to the number of separate
challenges.
ICSID had registered 735 cases under the ICSID Convention and
Additional Facility Rules as of April 26, 2019, and eighty-five of those cases
have had at least one arbitrator challenge. Some of these cases have had
multiple challenges, resulting in a total of 146 arbitrator challenges.111 The
fact that 11.6% of the total cases have been slowed down by arbitrator
challenges supports the idea that incentives for raising the complaint are high
for parties who simply want to delay the challenge, because a challenge at
an advanced stage in the arbitration involves significant disruption and
prejudice.112 An estimated sixty-eight percent of these challenges have been
made to one member of the tribunal, but the number of challenges to most or
all of the tribunal and multiple challenges in a single case, sometimes with
respect to the same arbitrator, is increasing.113
This trend mirrors the increase in the number of cases overall. By using
data provided by the ICSID Secretary-General, made publicly available on
the ICSID website, and published in an annual ICSID report on caseload, the
below graph compares the number of challenges per year to the total number
of cases filed with ICSID each year.114

111. ICSID, supra note 9.
112. Daele, supra note 13, at 103. This disruption comes from the fact that highly in-demand
arbitrators may not be able to reschedule the time-consuming hearing on short notice and from the fact
that, if an arbitrator resigns or is disqualified, some parts of the hearing may need to be repeated for the
newly-constituted tribunal. The arbitrators may be prejudiced against one party due to frustration created
by the disruption and delay. Id. at 104.
113. Kinnear, supra note 18, at 412. Neither of these challenges for arbitrator disqualification were
made public.
114. See ICSID, supra note 9, at 7; Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13; ICSID, Advanced Search,
ICSID: WORLD BANK GROUP, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/ AdvancedSearch.aspx (last
visited May 3, 2019).
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Table 2. Number of Challenges Filed Per Year Compared to Total
Number of Cases Filed Per Year
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The first arbitrator challenge was filed in Amco v. Indonesia in 1982,
but the next challenge was not filed until sixteen years later in Pey Casado
v. Chile.115 When Amco was decided upon, parties had filed only two cases
with ICSID.116 By the time Pey Casado was adjudicated, ICSID had about
ten new cases being filed each year, but arbitrator challenges were still few
and far between.117
The increase in arbitrator challenges is a result of the increasing
complexity of international arbitration and parties using challenges as a
strategy to disrupt the arbitration.118 The fact situations and legal questions
presented in arbitrations continue to increase in both complexity and
number.119 Again, parties are increasingly using arbitrator challenges to
delay the proceedings or frustrate the opposing party.120 We cannot do much
about the increasing complexity, but we can reduce the incentives or avenues
115. Kinnear, supra note 18, at 412.
116. See supra Table 2.
117. Id.
118. See Pallavi Shroff, Due Process in International Arbitration: Balancing Procedural Fairness
and Efficiency, in 19 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE RULE OF LAW: CONTRIBUTION AND
CONFORMATION 797, 805 (Andrea Menaker ed., 2017).
119. Kinnear, supra note 18, at 416.
120. O’Brien & Nandivada, supra note 35, at 1.
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for parties to pursue disruptive tactics. Accordingly, the scope of this Article
is not about the increasing complexity, but this complexity almost certainly
does have an effect on the total number of changes.
Additionally, more potential conflicts have arisen as the overall number
of arbitrators has increased. This increase in conflicts comes in part from the
fact that the available pool of arbitrators has not grown at the same rate as
the overall number of arbitrations, generally leading parties to nominate
arbitrators from the same small pool of qualified individuals.121 The small
community of investment arbitration professionals and the dual roles of
arbitrators, with arbitrators acting simultaneously as counsel, arbitrator, or
expert witness in other investment cases, have become characteristic features
of the ICSID system.122 A potential arbitrator’s previous familiarity with a
party or counsel, the subject matter of the case, or the legal issues in that case
are often factors that the nominating party considers, and can even weigh in
favor of that arbitrator’s selection.123 These characteristics increase the
number of conflicts that can potentially be raised in ICSID arbitrations. But,
the fact that an arbitrator has faced similar legal or factual issues in other
cases is not sufficient to prove bias.124
Although proposals for arbitrator disqualification have been as brief as
only one day, as seen in Olguín v. Paraguay, this is usually the exception—
the typical delay is much longer.125 The range of delay extends to a high of
260 days in Carnegie Minerals (Gambia) Ltd. v. Republic of The Gambia.126
A proposal for disqualification of an arbitrator takes eighty-one days, or

121. C. Mark Baker & Lucy Greenwood, Are Challenges Overused in International Arbitration?,
30 J. OF INT’L ARB. 101, 103 (2013); Giorgetti, supra note 67, at 438.
122. CLEIS, supra note 51, at 86.
123. Id.
124. Universal Compression Int’l Holdings, S.L.U. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/9, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify Prof. Brigitte Atern and Prof. Guido
Santiago Tawil, Arbitrators, ¶ 83 (May 10, 2011) (“The international investment arbitration framework
would cease to be viable if an arbitrator was disqualified simply for having faced similar factual or legal
issues in other arbitrations.”).
125. See Señor Eudoro Armando Olguín v. República del Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5,
Award (July 26, 2001). This case had such a brief delay because the arbitrator immediately resigned
following the filing of the proposal for arbitration disqualification.
126. Id. at ¶ 15–16. See also ICSID, Case Details: Carnegie Minerals (Gambia) Limited v. Republic
of The Gambia (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/19), ICSID: WORLD BANK GROUP,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail. aspx?CaseNo=ARB%2f09%2f19 (last visited
May 17, 2019). The delay in Utsch M.O.V.E.R.S. Int’l v. Arab Republic of Egypt was technically longer,
at 851 days, but the parties agreed to suspend the proceedings during the midst of this arbitrator challenge,
making this case an unusual scenario. See ICSID, Case Details: Utsch M.O.V.E.R.S. International GmbH,
Erich Utsch Aktiengesellschaft, and Helmut Jungbluth v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No.
ARB/13/37), ICSID: WORLD BANK GROUP, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?
CaseNo=ARB%2f13%2f37 (last visited May 17, 2019).

PITA FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

186

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

12/2/2019 1:46 PM

[Vol 30:163

almost three months, on average. Because twenty-five cases with a proposal
for disqualification actually involved multiple arbitrator challenges, a case
that involves at least one proposal for disqualification is delayed for an
average of 103 days, or almost three and half months.127 These delays are
added onto proceedings that are already lengthy. Data from between 2013
and 2017 indicates that an average investment arbitration case involving a
challenge lasts 4.3 years.128
Even before arbitrator challenges arise, the cost involved in the
investment arbitration process has already increased.129 According to a
survey conducted by attorneys at Allen & Overy, mean claimant-party costs
were 4.4 million U.S. dollars, and mean-respondent party costs were 4.6
million U.S. dollars at the end of 2012.130 The attorneys conducted the survey
again in 2017, employing the same methodology to determine the costs of
arbitration post-2013, and determined that costs had increased by sixty-eight
percent for claimants and thirteen percent for respondents, resulting in mean
party costs of 7.4 million U.S. dollars and 5.2 million U.S. dollars
respectively.131

127. See infra Appendix 2.
128. Id.
129. See infra Table 2.
130. Matthew Hodgson & Alastair Campbell, Damages and Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration
Revisited, GLOBAL ARB. REV., Dec. 14, 2017, at 2, http://www.allenovery.com/
SiteCollectionDocuments/141217Damagesandcostsininvestmenttreatyarbitrationrevisited.pdf.
131. Id.
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Table 3. Average Party Costs Pre-2013 and Post-2013132
Claimant
(Pre-2013)

Respondent
(Pre-2013)

Claimant
(Post-2013)

Respondent
(Post-2013)

Average
$4,437,000 $4,559,000
$6,019,000 $4,855,000
Party
Costs in
USD
Average
ICSID
$746,000
$920,000
Tribunal
Costs in
USD
* The estimate for average party costs refers to the fees and expenses of
counsel, experts, and witnesses.
** The estimate for average tribunal costs refers to the fees and expenses of
arbitrators and ICSID institutional charges.
B. Does the Extra Time and Cost Pay Off in the Form of Successful
Challenges?
Although the arbitrator challenges often create extensive delays and
cost increases, this typically does not have any effect on the tribunal’s
constitution, as these proposals for disqualification are rarely successful. Of
the 146 arbitrator challenges that have been made public, only five have been
upheld.133 In 106 cases, the arbitrator challenge was declined, leaving only a
delayed proceeding and an increased total cost for the parties.134 Though
some of these challenges may have been an attempt on the part of one of the
parties to ensure the independence and impartiality of the tribunal, with only
3.4% of arbitrator challenges actually being upheld, there is a concern that
many of these proposals for disqualification are merely frivolous challenges
intended to exhaust or frustrate counterparties.135
The low success rate of challenges in the ICSID stands in stark contrast
to the success rate in other major international arbitral systems. Many of
these institutions do not publish their challenge decisions, but some general
trends are still known.136 At UNCITRAL, thirty to forty percent of arbitrator
132. Id.
133. See infra Appendix 1.
134. Id. Of the other cases, one arbitrator challenge is currently pending and two arbitrator
challenges were never decided upon because the proceedings were discontinued.
135. Id.
136. CLEIS, supra note 51, at 111.
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challenges have been successful.137 The LCIA has published some
anonymized summaries of arbitrator challenges decided by the court
between 1996 and 2017, which show that challenges were made in less than
two percent of the cases before the court and were successful, either in whole
or in part, in only about twenty-three percent of those cases.138 This shows
that ICSID challenges are less likely to succeed than challenges under the
rules of most other international arbitration institutions.139 From 2013 to
2015, the SCC made thirteen decisions on arbitrator challenges, excluding
decisions made in still-ongoing arbitrations, and upheld four of them, or
thirty-one percent.140 It is not clear how many cases have come before the
SCC because arbitrations before the institution are confidential.141
Furthermore, the ICC allows for the examination of an individual’s
independence and impartiality both when they are appointed for a position
as an arbitrator and then during the proceeding if they are challenged by one
of the parties.142 The majority of challenges raised at the time of the
appointment result in non-confirmation.143
IV. DOES THE PROPOSED RULE SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
Adopting Rule 29 proposed in WP # 1 would be a substantial step
towards increasing the efficiency of ICSID arbitrations and decreasing the
length of ICSID arbitrations by weeks or even months. Not only will the
number of challenges decrease, but the challenges that are brought will be
less disruptive. Despite what some commentators have argued, the current
time limits—and those proposed in WP # 2—are not sufficient to prevent
extensive delays. Additionally, the negative impact of adopting WP # 1
would be minimal, and it would not call into question the legitimacy of
decisions made by the tribunal as much as some critics believe.
A. Rule 29 Would Decrease the Overall Number of Challenges.
Under this rule, an average delay of eighty-one days for every arbitrator
challenge would be a concern of the past, a notable improvement considering
137. Id.
138. Philip Clifford, Hanna Roos & Eleanor Scogings, Arbitrator Challenges: The Long View, 2018
NEW L. J. 15, 15 (2018).
139. Baker & Greenwood, supra note 121, at 110.
140. ANJA HAVEDAL, STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INST., SCC PRACTICE NOTE: SCC
BOARD DECISIONS ON CHALLENGES TO ARBITRATORS 2013-2015 at 5–9 (2016), https://sccinstitute.com/
media/176447/scc-decisions-on-challenges-to-arbitrators-2013-2015.pdf.
141. CLEIS, supra note 51, 125.
142. Id. at 132–33.
143. Id. at 136.
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that even the current ICSID Secretary-General anticipates that the number of
arbitrator challenges will only continue to rise.144 Adopting this proposal will
eliminate the incentives that parties have to bring challenges simply to delay
the proceeding, thereby decreasing the overall number of challenges.
Such delaying tactics, brought to frustrate the opposing party and delay
the proceedings, account for the high number of arbitrator challenges and the
resulting low—3.4 percent—success rate. With such a low success rate,
many parties must file proposals for disqualification knowing they have a
slim chance of winning. However, the delay and frustration to the other party
created by the challenge may be worth the increase in cost. Eliminating the
automatic suspension of the proceedings would erase this incentive, leading
to fewer overall challenges.
B. Rule 29 Would Reduce the Number of Arbitrators That Resign After a
Party Files an Arbitrator Challenge Against Them.
An ancillary benefit of the decreasing number of challenges is a
subsequent decrease in the number of resignations: the 3.4% of unsuccessful
challenges does not tell the entire story of arbitrator challenges. In twentyeight of these cases, or nineteen percent of total arbitrator challenges, the
challenged arbitrator resigned after the proposal for disqualification was
filed.145 A challenge that casts doubts on an arbitrator’s impartiality and
independence can have significant negative impacts on an arbitrator’s
reputation, even if the challenge is ultimately rejected.146 In contrast, there
are also some situations in which an arbitrator appears to collude with a party
to resign in bad faith.147 Charles Brower, an individual who has served as an
arbitrator in a multitude of cases and has been challenged six times, has been
asked to resign because a party did not want to finance challenge
proceedings.148 He states that it is important for arbitrators to speak with the
party that appointed them and offer to resign.149 Brower has also resigned
before, at the appointing party’s request, so that the party that appointed him
could adhere to other agreements and to ensure that no future award could
be challenged on the grounds that the tribunal was not properly
constituted.150 Although there seems to be a connection between the
144. Kinnear, supra note 18, at 416.
145. Id.
146. Pfister, supra note 66, at 166.
147. Judith Levine, “Late-in-the Game” Arbitrator Challenges and Resignations, 108 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 419, 423 (2014).
148. Charles N. Brower, Remarks by Charles N. Brower, 108 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 423, 427
(2014).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 426.
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resignations and the proposals for arbitrator disqualifications, it is unclear
how much of this related to the merits of the proposal instead of a
conciliatory attitude of the challenged arbitrator.151
With a lower number of challenges altogether, there will be fewer
opportunities for arbitrators to resign. Nineteen percent of challenges
currently cause an arbitrator to resign. This is an unfavorable outcome, since
it is unclear how many of these arbitrators would actually be disqualified if
the tribunal had an opportunity to decide on the disqualification proposal.
Having its first-choice arbitrator resign without sufficient concerns with their
independence and impartiality deprives a party of its autonomy, which is one
of the biggest reasons that parties enter into investment arbitration.
C. The Challenges that Rule 29 Would Not Eliminate Would Be Less
Disruptive to the Arbitral Proceedings Than Those Allowed Under the
Current Rule.
Furthermore, the challenges that are still brought would not be nearly
as disruptive, since the enormous delay that many proposals for
disqualification create will be eliminated with the deletion of the automaticsuspension provision. Many Member States recognized this potential for
increased efficiency in their public written comments and therefore
supported the WP # 1 proposal, with or without a slight modification.152 Both
Australia and Austria, for example, explicitly expressed the opinion that the
elimination of the automatic suspension of proceedings would minimize “the
disruptive effects” that the current rules create.153 The European Union also
saw “merit” in ICSID’s efforts to speed up procedures by eliminating the
automatic suspension.154
D. WP # 2’s Term Limits Do Not Eliminate the Need for Rule 29’s
Continuation of the Proceedings.
In a public comment, Guglielmino Derecho Internacional, a law firm
located in Argentina, argues that eliminating the automatic suspension of
proceedings is unnecessary when the new rule also establishes fixed and
short terms to make suspension during the qualification decision
insignificant.155 However, WP # 2’s new time limits narrowing the window
in which a party can file a proposal for arbitrator disqualification are not
151. DAELE, supra note 13, at 105.
152. ICSID, RULE AMENDMENT PROJECT, supra note 34, at 224, 226, 229 (comments from Canada,
the European Union, and Singapore).
153. Id. at 221–23 (comments from Australia and Austria).
154. Id. at 226 (comment from the European Union).
155. Id. at 232 (comment from Guglielmino).
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sufficient for combatting the extensive delay arbitrator challenges create.
Even with these limitations, a delay can last weeks or months while the
remaining arbitrators—or, if necessary, the Chairman—decides on the
arbitrator proposal. Additionally, with many cases now involving multiple
challenges to arbitrators, adhering to these fixed and short terms can add
weeks or months to the time of the proceeding. For example, Conoco Phillips
v. Argentina had eight different arbitrator challenges.156 This resulted in a
total delay of 403 days, or just over thirteen months.157 Pey Casado v. Chile
saw the most proposals for disqualification with nine arbitrator challenges,
although not all separate, which were made over a span of nineteen years.158
The proceedings were suspended for 351 days because of arbitrator
challenges, and this number does not include the first two challenges, the
time frames of which were not made public.159
E. Adopting Rule 29 Would Not Call into Question the Legitimacy of the
Tribunal’s Decisions.
Finally, Member States, including Canada, Costa Rica, and Mexico,
and public commentators, such as Guglielmino, have expressed concern that
adopting WP # 1 might impact the legitimacy of the tribunal, since arbitrators
would still be able to discuss jurisdiction and merits of the case while the
proposal for disqualification is still pending.160 For example, Argentina
called it “highly inappropriate” to allow the proceeding to continue pending
a decision on an arbitrator challenge.161 However, this concern should not
prevent ICSID from adopting WP # 1’s proposal for three main reasons: 1)
WP # 1 would still increase efficiency overall, 2) ICSID has not experienced
questions of legitimacy in proceedings that have continued, and 3) other
arbitral institutions have not experienced problems with legitimacy.
Although the legitimacy of the tribunal may be a concern in those cases
in which the arbitrator challenge is upheld, those cases are so few as to be
negligible: only 3.5% of those challenges are successful. These concerns

156. See infra Appendix 1.
157. See infra Appendix 2.
158. See infra Appendix 1.
159. See infra Appendix 2.
160. ICSID, RULE AMENDMENT PROJECT, supra note 34, at 231–32 (comment from Guglielmino).
See id. at 224 (“Canada . . . is concerned that [eliminating the automatic suspension] could affect the
perceived legitimacy of the tribunal in the period in question.”); id. at 225 (comment from Costa Rica)
(“[T]he continuation of the process could affect its legitimacy.”); id. at 228 (comment from Mexico)
(stating that although it is desirable to decrease the number of arbitrator challenges intending to delay the
arbitral proceedings, it is also important to guarantee the integrity of the proceedings in the case where
arbitrator challenges are appropriate).
161. Id. at 221 (comment from the Argentine Republic).
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could be completely alleviated by a slight modification to WP # 1, as
recommended by Canada, which would allow either party to ask the tribunal
to review any decisions in which a disqualified arbitrator was involved. As
Colombia and Guatemala recognize, this would require an increased delay
in those cases where the proposal for disqualification was upheld.162
However, the increase in delay would be significantly outweighed by the
decrease in delay seen in the vast majority of cases in which the proposal for
arbitrator disqualification is declined. Again, only 3.5% of challenges are
successful; still others would be relatively minor and not material to the case,
so those, too, would not need to be reconsidered. This leaves few instances
in which any decisions would have to be reconsidered, with a resulting delay.
On the other hand, under WP # 1 the vast majority of cases would see a
significant improvement in efficiency. Singapore recognized the disparity
between the number of successful arbitrator challenges and the number of
total challenges and noted the proposed elimination of the automatic
suspension “is more likely than not to increase the efficiency of the
disqualification process.”163 Even the delay in the cases where an arbitrator
was disqualified could be minimized if the parties agreed to suspend the
proceedings, which may happen when both parties realize that there could
be an issue with an arbitrator’s impartiality and independence.
Some parties have decided to continue with proceedings even under the
current rule, and none of these cases has experienced major concerns with
legitimacy. This is permissible under Article 44 of the Convention, which
allows parties to agree to deviate from ICSID Rules.164 In Salini v. Jordan,
the parties continued with the previously scheduled session of the arbitration
proceeding even after one of the parties filed an arbitrator challenge.165 They
met informally during this session to agree on procedural issues such as
bifurcation of the proceeding and the schedule for the submission of written
proceedings.166 After the challenged arbitrator resigned, the reconstituted
Tribunal was presented with and adopted the procedural agreements that had

162. Id. at 224 (stating that the fact that the tribunal may continue during arbitral challenges could
affect the proceeding’s efficiency if one of the parties asked for review of the proceedings and the
decision was made while the arbitrator challenge was being assessed); id. at 226 (listing Guatemala’s
comment that the possibility that the parties could ask the tribunal to consider anything resolved by a
disqualified arbitrator does not make continuing proceedings during arbitrator challenges more efficient).
163. Id. at 229 (comment from Singapore).
164. See Convention, supra note 15, art. 44. The Article reads:
Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section
and, except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on
the date on which the parties consented to the arbitration.
165. DAELE, supra note 13, at 102–03.
166. Id.
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already been reached.167 In Carnegie v. Gambia, the party filing the
challenge to the arbitrator stated that it did not want the proposal for
disqualification to interrupt the proceedings.168 Accordingly, both parties
filed briefs on the merits of the case, which meant that no changes were made
to the timetable to which the parties had originally agreed.169
The fact that these cases were able to successfully continue with
proceedings despite an arbitrator challenge suggests that eliminating the
automatic suspension will not affect the tribunal’s legitimacy—in the
interim, parties can successfully take care of both procedural and substantive
matters. Part of the reason for this is that arbitrator challenges typically occur
early in the proceedings.170 Facing these challenges earlier in the proceedings
makes it even less likely that a challenged arbitrator who is later disqualified
will take part in deciding on a matter that will call into question the tribunal’s
legitimacy.
Finally, as previously mentioned, the vast majority of other major
arbitral institution do not provide for an automatic suspension of the
proceedings.171 None of these other arbitral institutions have faced major
legitimacy problems; therefore, ICSID should not prioritize these
unsubstantiated concerns over the efficiency problems it is currently facing.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of these considerations, ICSID should adopt a slightly modified
version of the WP # 1 proposal. ICSID should eliminate the automatic
suspension of the proceedings, but it should add to the provision a clause that
requires the newly constituted tribunal to reevaluate any decisions in which
a disqualified arbitrator was involved, if the arbitrator challenge is
successful, in order to minimize concerns with legitimacy.
ICSID has rightly decided to address the concerns with efficiency that
many Member States have started to express. The data in this Article show
that arbitrator challenges are a notable source of inefficiency within the rules.
The rules for arbitrator challenges have remained largely untouched for fiftyone years. ICSID has the opportunity to promulgate rules that will make a
tangible impact on the efficiency of ICSID proceedings.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id. at 103.
Id.
See Kinnear & Frauke Nitschke, supra note 13.
Kryvoi, supra note 54, at 4.
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V. APPENDIX 1: ICSID PROPOSALS FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF
AN ARBITRATOR172 ORGANIZED BY LENGTH OF DELAY173

Case
Olguin v.
Paraguay
Pey Casado v.
Chile (3)
Nations
Energy, Inc.
and Others v.
Republic of
Panama (1)
ConocoPhillips
v. Venezuela
(7)
African
Holding v.
Congo
Sociedad
Aeroportuaria
v. Republic of
Peru
ALAS Int’l
Baustoffproduk
tions AG v.
Bosnia and
Herzegovina

Date of
Challenge
Mar. 16,
1999
Aug. 23,
2005

Date
Proceeding
Resumed
Mar. 17,
1999
Aug. 26,
2005

May 14,
2011

Decision

Days of
Delay

Resigned

1

Resigned

3

May 18,
2011

Resigned

4

July 22,
2016

July 26, 2016

Declined

4

May 11,
2006

May 17,
2016

Resigned

6

Jan. 15,
2019

Jan. 22, 2019

Resigned

7

Nov. 27,
2007

Dec. 4, 2007

Withdrawn

7

Pey Casado v.
Chile (6)*

Jan. 6,
2014

Jan. 13, 2014

Resigned

7

Suez and
Interagua v.

Oct. 15,
2007

Oct. 22, 2007

Declined

7

172. Each proposal for disqualification of an arbitrator is listed separately. If a party filed proposals
for disqualification of multiple or all members of the tribunal at the same time and the proposals were
dealt with in the same time frame, the proposals are still listed separately.
173. Data compiled using records made public by ICSID. Cases whose procedural details were not
made public are not included in this table, even if the case included an arbitrator challenge. The length of
delay was measured from the time the proposal of disqualification was filed to the time the tribunal
decided on the case or the challenged arbitrator announced his or her resignation.
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Argentine
Republic (1)
Suez and
Vivendi
Universal v.
Argentine
Republic (1)
Standard
Chartered Bank
(Hong Kong)
Ltd. v. United
Republic of
Tanzania
CEMEX v.
Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela
EDF v.
Argentina (1)
Electricidad
Argentina S.A.
v. Argentine
Republic (1)
S&T Oil
Equip. &
Mach. Ltd. v.
Romania
RSM Prod.
Corp. v.
Central African
Republic**
Raiffeisen
Bank Int’l v.
Republic of
Croatia
AS PNB Banka
v. Republic of
Latvia
ConocoPhillips
v. Venezuela
(6)

Oct. 15,
2007

Oct. 22, 2007

Declined

7

June 29,
2016

July 7, 2016

Resigned

8

Oct. 26,
2009

Nov. 6, 2009

Declined

11

June 22,
2006

July 7, 2006

Resigned

15

June 22,
2006

July 7, 2006

Resigned

15

Apr. 9,
2009

Apr. 24, 2009 Resigned

15

Feb. 10,
2012

Feb. 27, 2012

Resigned

17

Feb. 28,
2017

May 17,
2018

Declined

17

Sept. 12,
2018

Sept. 29,
2018

Resigned

17

Feb. 26,
2016

Mar. 15,
2016

Declined

18
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Total S.A. v.
Argentine
Republic
STEAG GmbH
v. Kingdom of
Spain
Blue Bank v.
Argentina (1)
Rail World v.
Estonia
Joseph C.
Lemire v.
Ukraine
SGS v.
Pakistan
Mathias Kruck
v. Kingdom of
Spain (1)
Crystallex Int’l
Corp. v.
Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela
Koch Minerals
and Koch
Nitrogen v.
Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela (2)
Koch Minerals
and Koch
Nitrogen v.
Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela (3)
Koch Minerals
and Koch
Nitrogen v.
Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela (4)

[Vol 30:163

Aug. 6,
2015

Aug. 26,
2015

Declined

20

Aug. 19,
2018
Aug. 16,
2013
July 31,
2006

Sept. 11,
2018

Declined

22

Sept. 9, 2013
Aug. 24,
2006

Resigned

24

Resigned

24

Aug. 29,
2008
Nov. 22,
2002

Sept. 23,
2008
Dec. 19,
2002

Declined

25

Declined

27

Feb. 13,
2018

Mar. 16,
2018

Declined

31

Nov. 18,
2013

Dec. 19,
2013

Resigned

31

Mar. 29,
2014

Apr. 30, 2014 Declined

32

Mar. 29,
2014

Apr. 30, 2014 Declined

32

Mar. 29,
2014

Apr. 30, 2014 Declined

32
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The Loewen
Group, Inc. v.
United States
RSM Prod.
Corp. v. Saint
Lucia
ConocoPhillips
v. Venezuela
(6)
SolEs Badajoz
GmbH v.
Kingdom of
Spain
Alpiq AG v.
Romania
Compania de
Aguas del
Aconquija S.A.
and Vivendi
Universal v.
Argentine
Republic**
Gran Colombia
Gold Corp. v.
Republic of
Colombia
Alpha
Projektholding
v. Ukraine
City-State N.V.
v. Ukraine
TECO
Guatemala
Holdings, LLC
v. Republic of
Guatemala
Saba Fakes v.
Republic of
Turkey
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Aug. 9,
2001

Sept. 10,
2001

Resigned

32

Sept. 19,
2014

Oct. 23, 2014

Declined

34

Nov. 9,
2015

Dec. 15,
2015

Declined

36

Sept. 18,
2017
Apr. 24,
2017

Oct. 24, 2017

Resigned

36

June 1, 2017

Declined

38

Aug. 24,
2001

Oct. 3, 2001

Declined

40

Nov. 26,
2018

Feb. 5, 2019

Resigned

40

Feb. 5,
2010
Aug. 6,
2015

Mar. 19,
2010
Sept. 18,
2015

Declined

42

Resigned

43

Feb. 15,
2011

Mar. 30,
2011

Resigned

43

Mar. 14,
2008

Apr. 26, 2008 Declined

43
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Samsung
Engineering
Co., Ltd. v.
Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia
Tethyan
Copper Co. v.
Islamic
Republic of
Pakistan (1)
Abaclat v.
Argentine
Republic (3)
Abaclat v.
Argentine
Repulic (4)
Interocean v.
Nigeria (1)
Interocean v.
Nigeria (2)
Interocean v.
Nigeria (3)
Fabrica de
Vidrios and
Owens-Illinois
v. Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela (4)
Pey Casado v.
Chile (8)**
Tanzania Elec.
Supply Co.
Ltd. v. Indep.
Power
Tanzania Ltd.
(1) ***
Mobil
Exploration
and Mobile
Argentina v.
Argentine
Republic (1)

[Vol 30:163

Mar. 15,
2018

Apr. 28, 2018 Declined

44

July 23,
2012

Sept. 7, 2012

Resigned

46

Dec. 19,
2013

Feb. 4, 2014

Declined

47

Feb. 4, 2014

Declined

47

Oct. 3, 2017

Declined

48

Oct. 3, 2017

Declined

48

Oct. 3, 2017

Declined

48

Sept. 12,
2016

Dec. 19,
2013
Aug. 16,
2017
Aug. 16,
2017
Aug. 16,
2017

July 25,
2016
Feb. 23,
2017

Declined

49

Apr. 13, 2017 Declined

49

Jan. 22,
2010

Mar. 12,
2010

Resigned

49

Apr. 15,
2015

June 4, 2015

Declined

50
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Mobil
Exploration
and Mobile
Argnetina v.
Argentine
Republic (2)
Mobil
Exploration
and Mobile
Argnetina v.
Argentine
Republic (3)
CEAC
Holdings v.
Montenegro
Caratube and
Hourani v.
Kazakhstan
Blue Bank v.
Argentina
(3)**
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Apr. 15,
2015

June 4, 2015

Declined

50

Apr. 15,
2015

June 4, 2015

Declined

50

Apr. 22,
2015

June 12,
2015

Declined

51

Jan. 28,
2014

Mar. 20,
2014

Upheld

51

Jan. 8,
2018

Mar. 2, 2018

Declined

53

Burlington Res. Jan. 8,
v. Ecuador (2)
2018

Mar. 2, 2018

Declined

53

Burlington Res. Jan. 8,
v. Ecuador (3)
2018

Mar. 2, 2018

Declined

53

Jan. 8,
2018

Mar. 2, 2018

Declined

53

Nov. 4,
2016

Dec. 28,
2016

Declined

54

Nov. 4,
2016

Dec. 28,
2016

Declined

54

Nov. 4,
2016

Dec. 28,
2016

Declined

54

Mar. 11,
2014

May 5, 2014

Declined

55

Burlington Res.
v. Ecuador (4)
BSG Res. Ltd.
v. Republic of
Guinea (1)
BSG Res. Ltd.
v. Republic of
Guinea (2)
BSG Res. Ltd.
v. Republic of
Guinea (3)
ConocoPhillips
v. Venezuela
(2)
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ConocoPhillips
v. Venezuela
(3)
Tidewater v.
Venezuela
Ickale Insaat
Ltd. Sirketi v.
Turkmenistan
Tethyan
Copper Co. v.
Islamic
Republic of
Pakistan (2)
Koch Minerals
and Koch
Nitrogen v.
Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela (1)
Electrabel v.
Hungary
Elitech v.
Republic of
Croatia
Abaclat v.
Argentine
Republic (1)
Abaclat v.
Argentine
Republic (2)
Flughafen
Zurich A.G. v.
Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela**
Champion
Holding Co. v.
Arab Republic
of Egypt
Tethyan
Copper Co. v.
Islamic

[Vol 30:163

Mar. 11,
2014
Sept. 28,
2010

May 5, 2014
Dec. 23,
2010

Declined

55

Declined

55

May 16,
2014

July 11, 2014

Declined

56

July 7,
2017

Sept. 5, 2017

Declined

60

Feb. 24, 2014

Declined

62

Feb. 25, 2008

Declined

66

Feb. 16,
2018

Apr. 23, 2018 Declined

66

Sept. 15,
2011

Dec. 21,
2011

Declined

66

Sept. 15,
2011

Dec. 21,
2011

Declined

66

Dec. 13,
2017

Feb. 19, 2018

Declined

68

Nov. 11,
2016

Jan. 18, 2017

Declined

68

Nov. 25,
2017

Feb. 5, 2018

Declined

73

Dec. 24,
2013
Dec. 21,
2007
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Republic of
Pakistan (3)
Tethyan
Copper Co. v.
Islamic
Republic of
Pakistan (4)
Tethyan
Copper Co. v.
Islamic
Republic of
Pakistan (5)
Saipem v.
People’s
Republic of
Bangladesh
Getma v.
Guinea
Iskandar Safa
and Akram
Safa v.
Hellenic
Republic
KS Invest and
TLS Invest v.
Spain
Transban
Investments v.
Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela (1)
Transban
Investments v.
Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela (2)
Sempra Energy
Int’l v.
Argentine
Republic (1)

Nov. 25,
2017

Feb. 5, 2018

Declined

73

Nov. 25,
2017

Feb. 5, 2018

Declined

73

July 26,
2005
Apr. 15,
2012

Oct. 11, 2005
June 28,
2012

Declined

74

Declined

74

Dec. 23,
2016

Mar. 7, 2017

Declined

74

Feb. 14,
2018

Apr. 30, 2018 Declined

75

Feb. 24,
2014

May 13,
2014

Declined

78

Feb. 24,
2014

May 13,
2014

Declined

78

Mar. 19,
2007

June 5, 2007

Declined

78
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Sempra Energy
Int’l v.
Argentine
Republic (2)
Sempra Energy
Int’l v.
Argentine
Republic (3)
Rusoro Mining
v. Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela
Fabrica de
Vidrios and
Owens-Illinois
v. Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela (3)
Longreef
Investments
A.V.V. v.
Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela
Quiborax v.
Plurinational
State of Bolivia
(1)
Quiborax v.
Plurinational
State of Bolivia
(2)
Quiborax v.
Plurinational
State of Bolivia
(3)
Perenco v.
Republic of
Ecuador
Aktau Petrol v.
Republic of
Kazakhstan

[Vol 30:163

Mar. 19,
2007

June 5, 2007

Declined

78

Mar. 19,
2007

June 5, 2007

Declined

78

Mar. 28,
2013

June 14,
2013

Declined

78

Mar. 4,
2016

Mar. 21,
2016

Declined

78

Nov. 7,
2011

Jan. 24, 2012

Declined

78

Apr. 7,
2010

Jul. 6, 2010

Declined

80

Apr. 7,
2010

Jul. 6, 2010

Declined

80

Apr. 7,
2010

Jul. 6, 2010

Declined

80

Sept. 19,
2009

Dec. 8, 2009

Resigned

80

July 17,
2015

Nov. 9, 2015

Declined

84
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OI European
Group v.
Venezuela
Blue Bank v.
Argentina (2)
Big Sky
Energy v.
Republic of
Kazakhstan
Fabrica de
Vidrios and
Owens-Illinois
v. Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela (1)
Nations
Energy, Inc.
and Others v.
Republic of
Panama (2)
Azurix Corp. v.
Argentine
Republic
Fabrica de
Vidrios and
Owens-Illinois
v. Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela (2)
ConocoPhillips
v. Venezuela
(4)
EDF v.
Argentina
(3))**
Opic Karimum
Co. v.
Venezuela
Participaciones
Inversiones
Portuarias
SARL v.
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Dec. 13,
2017
Aug. 16,
2013

Mar. 9, 2018
Nov. 12,
2013

Declined

86

Upheld

88

Jan. 30,
2018

May 3, 2018

Upheld

93

Mar. 13,
2015

June 16,
2015

Declined

95

May 14,
2011

Sept. 7, 2011

Declined

96

Dec. 8,
2004

Mar. 14,
2005

Declined

96

Mar. 13,
2015

June 17,
2015

Resigned

96

Mar. 25,
2015

July 1, 2015

Declined

98

Aug. 6,
2015

Nov. 20,
2015

Declined

106

Jan. 17,
2011

May 5, 2011

Declined

108

July 25,
2009

Nov. 12,
2009

Declined

110
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Gabonese
Republic
Pey Casado v.
Chile (7)**
Vattenfall AB
v. Fed.
Republic of
Germany (1)
Vattenfall AB
v. Fed.
Republic of
Germany (2)
Vattenfall AB
v. Fed.
Republic of
Germany (3)
Muhammet
Cap v.
Turkemistan
Generation
Ukraine v.
Ukraine
Saint-Gobain
Plastics v.
Venezuela
Siemens A.G.
v. Argentine
Republic
Fabrica de
Vidrios and
Owens-Illinois
v. Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela (5)
Burlington
Resources v.
Ecuador (1)
ConocoPhillips
v. Venezuela
(1)

Nov. 22,
2016

Feb. 21, 2017

Declined

113

Nov. 12,
2018

Mar. 6, 2019

Declined

114

Nov. 12,
2018

Mar. 6, 2019

Declined

114

Nov. 12,
2018

Mar. 6, 2019

Declined

114

Nov. 19,
2017

Mar. 16,
2018

Declined

117

Mar. 9,
2001

July 5, 2001

Declined

118

Oct. 29,
2012

Feb. 27, 2013

Declined

121

Dec. 7,
2004

Apr. 15, 2005 Declined

129

Dec. 23,
2016

May 5, 2017

Declined

133

July 25,
2013

Dec. 13,
2013

Upheld

141

Oct. 5,
2011

Feb. 27, 2012

Declined

145
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ConocoPhillips
v. Venezuela
(4)
Urbaser v.
Argentina
Repsol v.
Argentina (1)
Repsol v.
Argentina (2)
Suez and
Interagua v.
Argentine
Republic (2)
Suez and
Vivendi
Universal v.
Argentine
Republic (2)
Pey Casado v.
Chile (4)
Pey Casado v.
Chile (5)
Universal
Compression v.
Venezuela (2)
Asset Recovery
Trust v.
Argentine
Republic
Universal
Compression v.
Venezuela (1)
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Feb. 6,
2015
Mar. 18,
2010
July 18,
2013
July 18,
2013

July 1, 2015
Aug. 12,
2010
Dec. 13,
2013
Dec. 13,
2013

Nov. 29,
2007

Nov. 29,
2007
Aug. 24,
2005
Aug. 24,
2005

Declined

145

Declined

147

Declined

148

Declined

148

May 12,
2008

Declined

164

May 12,
2008

Declined

164

Feb. 21, 2006

Declined

181

Feb. 21, 2006

Upheld

181

Nov. 12,
2010

May 20,
2011

Declined

189

May 19,
2006

Nov. 27,
2006

Declined

192

Nov. 4,
2010

May 20,
2011

Declined

197

EDF v.
Argentina (2)
Supervision y
Control S.A. v.
Republic of
Costa Rica (1)

Nov. 29,
2007

June 25,
2008

Declined

209

July 20,
2015

Mar. 7, 2016

Declined

231

Supervision y
Control S.A. v.

July 20,
2015

Mar. 7, 2016

Declined

231
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Republic of
Costa Rica (2)
Supervision y
Control S.A. v.
Republic of
Costa Rica (3)
Carnegie
Minerals
(Gambia) Ltd.
v. Republic of
the Gambia
Universal
Compression v.
Venezuela (3)
Utsch
M.O.V.E.R.S
International v.
Arab Republic
of Egypt
Tanzania Elec.
Supply Co.
Ltd. v. Indep.
Power
Tanzania Ltd.
(2)***
Mathias Kruck
v. Kingdom of
Spain (2)****
Elec. Argentina
S.A. v.
Argentine
Republic (2)
Amco v.
Indonesia
Zhinvali v.
Georgia
Salini v. Jordan
Pey Casado v.
Chile (1)

July 20,
2015

Mar. 7, 2016

Declined

231

Aug. 30,
2010

May 17,
2011

Declined

260

July 20,
2012

July 2, 2013

Withdrawn

347

Nov. 26,
2014

Mar. 26,
2017*

Withdrawn

851

June 25,
2010

N/A

Proceeding
discontinue
d

N/A

Apr. 16,
2019

N/A

N/A

N/A

Nov. 29,
2007

N/A

Proceeding
discontinue
d

N/A

Not public

June 24,
1982

Declined

Unknown

Not public
Apr. 8,
2003

Jan. 19, 2001

Declined

Unknown

Not public

Resigned

Unknown

Not public

Oct. 21, 1998

Resigned

Unknown
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Pey Casado v.
Mar. 16,
Chile (2)
Not public 2001
Resigned
Unknown
Corn Products
Int’l, Inc. v.
United
Mexican States Not public May 3, 2004 Resigned
Unknown
* This challenge took place during a resubmission proceeding of the
original award.
** This challenge took place during an annulment proceeding of the
original award.
*** This challenge took place during an interpretation proceeding of the
original award.
**** As of Apr. 26, 2019, this proposal had not yet been decided upon and
the proceeding was still suspended.
VI. APPENDIX 2: ICSID CASES INVOLVING A PROPOSAL FOR
DISQUALIFICATION OF AN ARBITRATOR174 ORGANIZED BY
LENGTH OF TOTAL DELAY TO CASE175
Case
Olguin v. Paraguay
African Holding v. Congo
ALAS Int’l Baustoffproduktions AG v. Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Sociedad Aeroportuaria v. Republic of Peru
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. United
Republic of Tanzania
CEMEX v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Electricidad Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic
S&T Oil Equip. & Mach. Ltd. v. Romania
AS PNB Banka v. Republic of Latvia
Raiffeisen Bank Int’l v. Republic of Croatia
RSM Prod. Corp. v. Central African Republic**
Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic
STEAG GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain

Days of Delay
1
6
7
7
8
11
15*
15
17
17
17
20
22

174. This chart reflects the total delay any case with at least one proposal for disqualification of an
arbitrator was filed. Proposals that the tribunal considered simultaneously did not count multiple times
towards the total delay.
175. Data compiled using records made public by ICSID. Cases whose procedural details were not
made public are not included in this table, even if the case included an arbitrator challenge. The length of
delay was measured from the time the proposal of disqualification was filed to the time the tribunal
decided on the case or the challenged arbitrator announced his or her resignation. The length of delay
does not include the time required to reconstitute the tribunal if the arbitrator resigned or was disqualified.
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Rail World v. Estonia
Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine
SGS v. Pakistan
Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela
Mathias Kruck v. Kingdom of Spain
The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States
RSM Prod. Corp. v. Saint Lucia
SolEs Badajoz GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain
Alpiq AG v. Romania
Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi
Universal v. Argentine Republic**
Gran Colombia Gold Corp. v. Republic of Colombia
Alpha Projektholding v. Ukraine
City-State N.V. v. Ukraine
Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey
TECO Guatemala Holdings, LLC v. Republic of
Guatemala
Samsung Engineering Co., Ltd. v. Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia
Interocean v. Nigeria
Tanzania Elec. Supply Co. Ltd. v. Indep. Power
Tanzania Ltd.****
Mobil Exploration and Mobile Argentina v. Argentine
Republic
Caratube and Hourani v. Kazakhstan
CEAC Holdings v. Montenegro
BSG Res. Ltd. v. Republic of Guinea
Tidewater v. Venezuela
Ickale Insaat Ltd. Sirketi v. Turkmenistan
Electrabel v. Hungary
Elitech v. Republic of Croatia
Champion Holding Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt
Flughafen Zurich A.G. v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela**
Getma v. Guinea
Iskandar Safa and Akram Safa v. Hellenic Republic
Saipem v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh
KS Invest and TLS Invest v. Spain
Longreef Investments A.V.V. v. Bolivarian Repunlic of
Venezuela
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24
25
27
31
31***
32
34
36
38
40
40
42
43
43
43
44
48
49*
50
51
51
54
55
56
66
66
68
68
74
74
74
75
78
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Rusoro Mining v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic
Transban Investments v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela
Perenco v. Republic of Ecuador
Quiborax v. Plurinational State of Bolivia
Aktau Petrol v. Republic of Kazakhstan
OI European Group v. Venezuela
Big Sky Energy v. Republic of Kazakhstan
Koch Minerals and Koch Nitrogen v. Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela
Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic
Nations Energy, Inc. and others v. Republic of Panama
(2)
Opic Karimum Corp. v. Venezuela
Participaciones Inversiones Portuarias SARL v.
Gabonese Republic
Abaclat v. Argentine Republic
Vattenfall AB v. Fed. Republic of Germany
Muhammet Cap v. Turkemistan
Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine
Saint-Gobain Plastics v. Venezuela
Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic
Blue Bank v. Argentina
Urbaser v. Argentina
Repsol v. Argentina
Suez and Interagua v. Argentine Republic
Suez and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic
Tethyan Copper Co. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Asset Recovery Trust v. Argentine Republic
Burlington Res. v. Ecuador
Supervision y Control S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica
Carnegie Minerals (Gambia) Ltd. v. Republic of the
Gambia
EDF v. Argentina
Pey Casado v. Chile
Fabrica de Vidrios and Owens-Illinois v. Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela
ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela
Universal Compression v. Venezuela

209

78
78
78
80
80
84
86
93
94
96
100
108
110
113
114
117
118
121
129
141
147
148
171
171
179
192
194
231
260
330
351*****
356
403
536
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Utsch M.O.V.E.R.S International v. Arab Republic of
Egypt
851
Amco v. Indonesia
Unknown
Corn Products Int’l, Inc. v. United Mexican States
Unknown
Salini v. Jordan
Unknown
Zhinvali v. Georgia
Unknown
* This number does not reflect the second proposal for disqualification that
was filed, since the proceeding was discontinued before the proposal could
be decided upon by the Tribunal.
** This challenge took place during an annulment proceeding of the original
award.

*** This number does not reflect the delay caused by the second proposal for
disqualification, which the Tribunal has not yet decided upon.
**** This challenge took place during an interpretation proceeding of the original
award.
***** This number does not reflect the delay caused by the first two arbitrator
challenges, the lengths of which are unknown.

